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Abstract 26	
Tool use is an important facet of everyday life, though sometimes it is necessary to use 27	
tools in ways that do not fit within their typical functions. Here we asked participants to 28	
imagine characters using objects based on instructions that fit the prototypical actions for 29	
the object or were atypical in a novel object-action imagery task. Atypical action 30	
instructions either described sensible, substitute uses of the object, or actions that were 31	
bizarre but possible. Participants were better able to imagine the prototypical than 32	
atypical actions, but no effect of bizarreness was found. We additionally assessed inter-33	
individual differences in movement imagery ability using two objective tests. 34	
Performance in the object-action imagery task correlated with the movement imagery 35	
tests, providing a link between motor simulations and mental imagery ability. 36	
 37	
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Introduction 40	
Everyday we use objects to facilitate our ability to accomplish goal-directed actions, 41	
spanning everything from eating and writing, to cooking and playing sports. Though the 42	
use of man-made artifacts, i.e., tools, to accomplish everyday tasks may appear to be a 43	
modern advancement, there is evidence that hominins have been using tools for several 44	
million years (Harmand et al., 2015). Indeed, the use of man-made tools and their 45	
associated sequences of goal-directed actions have been suggested as having a direct 46	
relationship with the development of human cognition (Davidson, 2010; Stout, 2011). 47	
Here we investigated how the typicality of instructed actions involving tools can 48	
influence mental imagery performance. Further, we examined how this measure of tool-49	
related imagery performance would relate to questionnaire measures of inter-individual 50	
differences in motor imagery ability. 51	
Generally, objects can be used to accomplish multiple goal-directed actions; some 52	
actions fit the prototypical use of the object, others may be possible as a substitute use of 53	
the object when a more suitable option is not available. Other actions may also be 54	
accomplished, but do not necessarily make sense. Considering a baseball bat as the 55	
object, the prototypical action would be to swing it with two hands (prototypical), but it 56	
can also be used as a walking support if a cane is not available (substitute; cf. variable 57	
affordances1 [Borghi & Riggio, 2015]). A person could also bite into a baseball bat; 58	 																																																								
1 While the use of an object for a substitute function constitutes a variable affordance 
(Borghi & Riggio, 2015), we also think that the term ‘affordance’ should be used in 
reference to physical objects and is generally not suitable for images of objects (see 
Madan et al., 2016, for a detailed discussion). 
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though possible, this would be a bizarre action. This approach of dissociating objects 59	
from their prototypical action manipulation has been a focus of recent research (e.g., 60	
Matheson et al., 2017; Mizelle & Wheaton, 2010a, 2010b; Mizelle et al., 2013; Tobia & 61	
Madan, 2017) and converges with work demonstrating dissociations between functional 62	
and manipulation knowledge of objects (e.g., Boronat et al., 2005; Buxbaum et al., 2000; 63	
Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; Garcea & Mahon, 2012; Guérard et al., 2015). We expected 64	
that people should perform better at imagining goal-directed actions that are prototypical 65	
than atypical. Predictions for a comparison between atypical types of actions, i.e., 66	
substitute vs. bizarre, were not as clear. While atypical, substitute actions are still 67	
plausible and thus may be more easily imagined than bizarre actions. However, bizarre 68	
visual imagery is known to be more distinctive and can be more vivid, known as the 69	
bizarreness effect (Anderson & Buyer, 1994; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). As a result, 70	
bizarre actions may be imagined better than substitute actions. However, it has been also 71	
shown that bizarre imagery is more difficult and can only be effective if sufficient time is 72	
given (Mercer, 1996; Toyota, 2002), which may also result in worse performance on 73	
these trials. 74	
We additionally were interested if performance in this object-action imagery task 75	
related to inter-individual ability in movement imagery. In other words, would 76	
participants who were generally better at movement imagery perform better at imagining 77	
these goal-oriented actions? To investigate this, we administered the Test of Ability in 78	
Movement Imagery (TAMI; Madan & Singhal, 2013, 2014) and the Florida Praxis 79	
Imagery Questionnaire (FPIQ; Ochipa et al., 1997). The TAMI involves imagining 80	
moving limbs and involves a comparable scale of movement imagery as the object-action 81	
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imagery task that was primarily of interest. However, actions in the TAMI are not goal-82	
oriented (i.e., intransitive). Thus, any shared processes between the two tasks are related 83	
to the movement imagery features, rather than the goal-directed properties. The FPIQ was 84	
designed for patients with apraxia (Ochipa et al., 1997), and only recently has been 85	
shown to be useful as a measure of movement imagery ability (Donoff et al., 2018; 86	
Madan & Singhal, 2013, 2014). Unlike the TAMI, the FPIQ indexes both transitive (i.e., 87	
goal-directed) and intransitive movement imagery processes, through four subscales. 88	
However, the FPIQ has not yet been used to examine inter-individual differences in a 89	
cognitive task (McAvinue & Robertson, 2008). 90	
To summarize, in the current study we asked participants to imagine the presented 91	
character shown using a specified object for a prescribed action. As the critical 92	
manipulation, actions corresponded to either prototypical or atypical uses of the object. 93	
This influence of action typicality on mental imagery would provide insight into the 94	
functional knowledge on imagery processes, particularly those relevant to motor 95	
simulations. Furthermore, an effect of bizarreness on action-related imagery may be 96	
useful in understanding the degree by which imagined actions correspond to semantic 97	
knowledge. With the additional inclusion of mental imagery questionnaires, namely the 98	
TAMI and FPIQ, we sought to bridge this object-action imagery task with work 99	
examining inter-individual ability in movement imagery. The FPIQ was initially designed 100	
for assessing apraxia, but here we aim to evaluate its use within healthy individuals as a 101	
correlate of motor simulation processes. However, as the FPIQ has yet to be used in this 102	
way, we may find that it is not relevant or sensitive enough for these purposes. Unlike the 103	
object-imagery task and the FPIQ, the TAMI does not involve goal-oriented imagery, but 104	
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does involve body-position imagery and shares processes relevant to motor simulation, 105	
extending the TAMI’s use from only being relevant in assessing movement imagery 106	
ability. 107	
  108	
Methods 109	
Participants 110	
A total of 45 undergraduate students (19.73 ± 1.94 [M ± SD] years old; 23 female; 42 111	
right-handed) enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Alberta 112	
participated for partial course credit. Participants gave written informed consent prior to 113	
beginning the study, which was approved by a University of Alberta Research Ethics 114	
Board. 115	
 116	
Materials 117	
Object images were chosen from a set of normative objects from the Bank of 118	
Standardized Stimuli (BOSS) (Brodeur et al., 2010, 2014; Guérard et al., 2015). Objects 119	
were selected such that they would be relatively high in motoric properties, while also 120	
being amenable to atypical-substitute actions. We selected objects from the 560 objects 121	
where Guérard et al. (2015) obtained ratings for graspability, ease of movement, ease of 122	
pantomime, and number of actions. The first three of these scales were 7-point Likert 123	
scales, , i.e., values ranged from 1 to 7, with higher numbers corresponding to increasing 124	
object manipulability. Number of actions was the mean rating and ranged from 0.05 to 125	
4.60, for the full database of 560 objects. For the 112 selected objects, ratings were as 126	
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follows [M ± SD]: graspability=6.74±0.59; ease of movement=6.74±0.46; ease of 127	
pantomime=5.77±1.05; number of actions=1.47±0.29. 128	
Characters were made in Daz Studio 3 (DAZ 3D Inc., Draper, UT) using the 129	
Victoria 4.2 (female) and Michael 4.0 (male) base models. Each character had a unique 130	
set of clothes and hairstyle. A total of 80 characters were made, and were rendered in 131	
poses corresponding to prototypical actions for each of the 112 selected objects, as well 132	
as a pose where the character was standing straight with their arms at their sides. 133	
 134	
Procedure 135	
The experiment consisted of a computerized imagery task, followed by several pencil-136	
and-paper movement imagery questionnaires.  137	
 138	
Object-action imagery task. Participants were instructed that they would be required to 139	
imagine a scene based on the provided images and instructions, from a third-person 140	
(allocentric) perspective. On each trial, participants were presented with a character, 141	
object, and action instruction for 8000 ms. The name of the object was presented under 142	
the object image to attenuate any potential issues with identifying the object. Across the 143	
80 trials, the character was male for 40 trials and female for the remaining 40 trials. The 144	
screen then went blank for 2000 ms. Next, participants viewed a response screen that 145	
presented them with a 3×3 grid of potential responses, showing three different characters 146	
in three distinct poses. Responses were numbered and participants selected a response by 147	
presenting the corresponding 1-9 key on the number pad portion of the computer 148	
keyboard. Participants were also instructed that they could respond ‘0’ if they were 149	
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unable to form a good mental image. After making their responses, participants saw a 150	
blank screen for 500 ms before the next trial began. See Figure 1 for an overview of this 151	
procedure. 152	
 153	
154	
Figure 1. Illustration of the instruction and response screens. 155	
 156	
Across 80 trials, on 40 trials the action instruction was ‘prototypical’ for the 157	
presented object, and was ‘atypical’ for the remaining 40 trials. When the action 158	
instruction was atypical, it was either ‘substitute or ‘bizarre,’ 20 trials of each. Trial order 159	
was randomized across conditions. As an example of these instructions, consider the 160	
participant was presented with a baseball bat as the object. The prototypical instruction 161	
was: “Imagine this character swinging this object with two hands.” The atypical-162	
substitute instruction was: “Imagine this character using this object as a support to walk.” 163	
The atypical-bizarre instruction was: “Imagine this character biting into this object.” 164	
The nine responses were presented such that each column showed a different 165	
character and each row showed a different manipulation pose (e.g., pantomiming 166	
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swinging a bat, using a cane, and randomly selected pose from the other objects’ 167	
generated poses). Thus, only three options presented the correct character and only three 168	
options presented the correct pose. On the atypical trials, the pose corresponding to the 169	
prototypical instruction was always included as one of the poses. Two of the authors 170	
(CRM and AN) went through the poses to exclude ones that may appear correct from 171	
being selected as the random pose. The different characters were included to increase task 172	
difficulty and increase the likelihood that participants were imagining the object-173	
character-action scenes, rather than just remembering the object image and action 174	
instructions and matching them to the potential response images. 175	
Four practice trials preceded the 80 trials of this imagery task (two prototypical, 176	
one atypical-substitute, one atypical-bizarre). 177	
 178	
Questionnaires. After the computerized object-action imagery task, participants were 179	
given two pencil-and-paper questionnaires: the Test of Ability in Movement Imagery 180	
(TAMI; Madan & Singhal, 2013, 2014) and the Florida Praxis Imagery Questionnaire 181	
(FPIQ; Ochipa et al., 1997). 182	
Briefly, the TAMI consists of 10 questions, preceded by a practice question. For 183	
each question, participants were instructed to imagine a series of five movements 184	
instructions; each involving manipulations of the head, arm/hand, torso, or leg/foot. After 185	
reading the instructions, participants flip to the response page and must select from a set 186	
of five body-positioning images, along with the options ‘none of the above’ and ‘unclear.’ 187	
Each question begins with the instruction to “Stand up straight with your feet together 188	
and hour hands at your sides. The correct answer was provided for the practice question 189	
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and participants were allowed to flip back and ask the experimenter for clarifications, but 190	
for the remaining 10 questions, the correct answer was not provided and participants were 191	
explicitly instructed not to flip back to the instructions nor ask the experimenter for 192	
further clarification. For further details on the TAMI, see Madan and Singhal (2013, 2014, 193	
2015). 194	
The Florida Praxis Imagery Questionnaire (FPIQ; Ochipa et al., 1997) evaluates 195	
movement- and object-related imagery ability, using four subscales: kinesthetic, position, 196	
action, and object. Each subscale consists of twelve questions, with two possible 197	
responses for each. Below are example questions for each subscale. 198	
Kinesthetic: Imagine you are using a handsaw. Which joint moves more, your shoulder or 199	
your wrist? 200	
Position: Imagine you are shaving with a disposable razor. Which finger is higher, your 201	
index finger or your pinky? 202	
Action: Imagine you are using a nail file to file your nails. Does your hand move in a 203	
circle or back and forth? 204	
Object: Is the part of the key you insert into the lock longer or shorter than the part you 205	
hold? 206	
 207	
Data Analysis 208	
Object-action imagery task. For all conditions, we scored the proportion of trials where 209	
the participant chose the image depicting the both the correct character and pose. For the 210	
atypical conditions, we additionally scored how often participants chose the pose 211	
corresponding with the prototypical action (with the correct character). 212	
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TAMI. Responses in the TAMI were scored using the weighted scoring procedure 213	
(TAMIw) proposed in Madan and Singhal (2014) and validated in Madan and Singhal 214	
(2015). Briefly, instead of scoring the ten questions as a score out of ten, questions are 215	
weighted based on their difficulty, such that each question is worth between one and five 216	
points. This approach yields a score out of 24, and has been shown to be more sensitive 217	
to inter-individual differences (Madan & Singhal, 2014, 2015). 218	
 219	
Results 220	
Object-action imagery task 221	
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the correct responses among 222	
the three conditions: prototypical, atypical-substitute, atypical-bizarre. The main effect 223	
of action typicality was significant [F(2,88)=39.16, p<.001, ηp2=.47]. Post-hoc 224	
comparisons indicated that performance in the prototypical condition was significantly 225	
better than for both atypical conditions [both p’s < .001; prototypical (M ± SEM): 226	
82.4±1.8%, atypical-substitute: 64.1±2.3%, atypical-bizarre: 64.7±2.9%]. Accuracy did 227	
not differ between the two atypical conditions [p=1.00]. Thus, typicality was relevant to 228	
the movement imagery, but it did not matter if the atypical action was bizarre or more 229	
sensible.  230	
The type of atypical condition did not influence how often participants chose the 231	
incorrect pose corresponding to the correct character and prototypical action [t(44)=0.04, 232	
p=.97; atypical-substitute: 17.7±1.8%, atypical-bizarre: 17.1±2.1%]. Thus, it appears that 233	
our differentiation of bizarre or merely ‘substitute’ atypical actions did not bear out in the 234	
current paradigm, and will be discussed further in the Discussion section. 235	
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 236	
Questionnaires 237	
Performance on the TAMI [M ± SD], using the weighted scoring method (TAMIw), was 238	
14.84±4.99 out of 24. This is consistent with prior studies using the TAMI (Madan & 239	
Singhal, 2014, 2015).  240	
Performance on the FPIQ subscales was also consistent with prior work with 241	
healthy adults (Madan & Singhal, 2013) [kinesthetic: 8.98±1.67, position: 10.53±1.55, 242	
action: 10.76±1.25, object: 10.71±1.51; each subscale consisted of 12 questions]. 243	
Numerically worse performance on the kinesthetic subscale replicates prior findings 244	
(Donoff et al., 2018; Madan & Singhal, 2013; Ochipa et al., 1997 [controls]). 245	
 246	
Correlations between object-action imagery task and questionnaires 247	
Mean accuracy in the object-action imagery task (across conditions) significantly 248	
correlated with performance on the TAMI [r(43)=.45, p=.002], suggesting that 249	
participants’ abilities in imagining the posed characters has similar properties to the 250	
imagery processes underlying body movement instructions of the TAMI. Mean accuracy 251	
in the object-action imagery task significantly correlated with the action and object 252	
subscales of the FPIQ [action: r(43)=.35, p=.02; object: r(43)=.41, p=.005]. Correlations 253	
with the remaining two subscales of the FPIQ were not significant [kinesthetic: 254	
r(43)=.18, p=.24; position: r(43)=.25, p=.10]. This pattern of results is not surprising, but 255	
is re-assuring. Given the design of the object-action task, it is apparent that performance 256	
should be related to similar imagery processes as in the action and object sub-scales of 257	
the FPIQ; however, this is nonetheless the first evidence of the FPIQ being useful in a 258	
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sample of young adults, to index task-related inter-individual differences in imagery 259	
ability. 260	
 261	
Discussion 262	
In the current study, we examined how well participants could imagine actions that were 263	
either prototypical or atypical uses of an object and how performance in these imaged 264	
actions related to questionnaire measures of motor imagery. As expected, people were 265	
better at imagining the prototypical than atypical actions. Importantly, rather than asking 266	
participants to subjectively evaluate their imagined actions, we used an objective task. 267	
Specifically, participants were presented with several images of different body positions, 268	
i.e., poses, and asked to choose the correct pose from the presented options. This 269	
approach was inspired by the Test of Ability in Movement Imagery (TAMI; Madan & 270	
Singhal, 2013, 2014), which similarly sought to objectively measure movement imagery.  271	
While objects have many potential functional uses (i.e., prototypical actions), 272	
functional knowledge is inherently a property of semantic memory. However, an object 273	
often has additional manipulation actions where it could be used, but are rarely done (i.e., 274	
substitute actions). This distinction has become a recent topic of study within the 275	
neuroimaging literature (e.g., Mizelle & Wheaton, 2010a, 2010b; Matheson et al., 2017; 276	
Mizelle et al., 2013; Tobia & Madan, 2017). A consideration with these previous studies, 277	
however, is that accuracy is quite high, thus only successful action imagery could be 278	
examined (Mizelle & Wheaton, 2010b; Tobia & Madan, 2017). Using a novel procedure, 279	
here we were able corroborate these findings, while also increasing the difficulty of the 280	
task. As such, future neuroimaging studies using a similar paradigm may be able to 281	
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additionally examine differences in brain activity related to imagery success vs. failure, 282	
rather than solely focusing on successful trials. 283	
We also found that across individuals, mean performance correlated with 284	
questionnaires designed to assess inter-individual ability in imagery, the Test of Ability 285	
in Movement Imagery (TAMI) and the Florida Praxis Imagery Questionnaire (FPIQ). 286	
Here we found that performance correlated with imagery of whole-body movements (i.e., 287	
the TAMI), as well as the action and object subscales of the FPIQ. This is interesting 288	
because it suggests a relationship between imagery for three types of actions: functional 289	
actions, whole body actions, and hand actions. This finding supports the idea that motor 290	
imagery functions hierarchically for the production of action and may incorporate 291	
cognitive processes involved in action simulation (Jeannerod, 1995).  This is the first use 292	
of the FPIQ as a cognitive psychology measure, as it was initially developed for clinical 293	
use. Our findings indicate that the FPIQ can also be useful for indexing ability to imagine 294	
tool-related interactions within samples of healthy individuals and should be considered 295	
when assessing motor imagery ability as a multidimensional ability (e.g., see McAvinue 296	
& Robertson, 2009). Moreover, the FPIQ is an objective measure, and thus cannot be 297	
confounded by traits that may result in response biases, such as motor skill confidence.  298	
An important consideration for the results presented here is the role of 299	
perspective. In our task, participants imagined characters performing actions from a third-300	
person, allocentric perspective. This point-of-view can be used to evoke movement 301	
imagery, however, motor and kinesthetic imagery components require a first-person 302	
perspective (Madan & Singhal, 2012). Moreover, this is in alignment with evidence 303	
suggesting that perspective plays an important role in motor simulations (e.g., Lorey et 304	
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al., 2009; Marzoli et al., 2011, 2013; Ruby & Decety, 2001). Between the atypical action 305	
instructions, if the atypical action was a plausible substitute use of the object (such as 306	
using a baseball bat as a cane) or a bizarre action did not influence participants’ 307	
performance. As such, it is possible that participants did not process action bizarreness 308	
per se, but rather processed the bizarre instruction only semantically and vividly, but did 309	
not engage any degree of motor simulation. This account may also relate to our FPIQ 310	
results, where the action and object subscales related to performance in the object-action 311	
imagery task, but did not relate to the kinesthetic subscale—which is likely more related 312	
to motor processing. A further limitation of our comparison of typicality is that some 313	
actions involved other body parts as the effector, such as the mouth in imaging to bite the 314	
baseball bat, while most actions involved only the hands. We had not considered this 315	
difference when designing the study, but is an important consideration for future 316	
research.  317	
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